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The Hijab, the Passover Seder, and Religion  
as a Shame-Consuming Dignity Machine— 
How We Can Learn to Understand, and Empathize  
with, the Traditional Religious Expressions of Others
Alan Abrams
 הלוכ השרפה לכ רומגיש דע ,יבא דבוא ימראמ שרודו ,חבשב םייסמו תונגב ליחתמ
He [the leader of the Passover Seder] begins with shame and ends in 
praise. And he expounds from “my father was a wandering Aramean” 
until the end of the section.1
—Mishnah Pesachim 10:4
I thought it was like the human body’s appendix—the way my immigrant grandfather would lead the Passover Seder in his Brooklyn apartment. It was boring, beyond boring, the way he would insist on reading every 
word of the Hebrew text none of us understood. There was no discussion of 
the great themes around the experiences of shame, enslavement, and, final-
ly, freedom and redemption that are embedded in the Exodus story. Surely, 
I thought, this kind of Judaism—Orthodox Judaism—was something that, 
while it had perhaps once had meaning and function, no longer had mean-
ing and would thus just shrivel away with time. Religion, to the extent it 
would continue to exist at all, would be more liberal, more humanistic, more 
full of meaning.
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We all know that’s not how things have turned out. Whether it’s in the 
realm of culture, religion, or politics—Trump in the United States, Brexit in 
England, or Modi’s Hindu nationalism in India—conservative expressions 
have shown a force that few of us who were liberally minded in the second 
half of the twentieth century would have expected. The growing polariza-
tion has left those of us who were called into ministry from liberal, hu-
manistic motivations—especially those of us called into chaplaincy—with 
a deep dilemma. The ethics of our profession forbid us from walling our-
selves off from conservative people, even if we feel a deep revulsion at the 
words—words we might hear as racist, homophobic, or anti-feminist—they 
speak. If a person comes into the realm of our ministry, whether it’s in the 
hospital or elsewhere, we are called to care for them.
It would, of course, be easy to just deny there is a dilemma here. We 
can say to ourselves, Well, it’s not about me. I’m just here to serve the person in 
need. My values and beliefs have nothing to do with it. But how can we really 
serve the person before us if we’re not willing and able to bring our full self 
to the ministry encounter? How can we summon the Holy into the room if 
we’re shutting down the part of our heart—our love of justice and the beau-
ty of human diversity—that has called so many of us into ministry in the 
first place? 
The claim of this essay is that we need new tools and new theological 
lenses to help us be able to be true to our full selves while we engage also 
in the task of seeking genuine understanding and empathy for the more 
traditionally religious persons-in-need before us. I ask—drawing especially 
on the groundbreaking work of a scholar of women in Islam—how liberal, 
Western biases affect how we understand the role of dignity and shame in 
the way people use, and refrain from using, their bodies to express their 
religious lives. I also seek to complicate liberal, Western assumptions by 
employing a recent move in the humanities, called affect studies, to bet-
ter understand how shame and dignity interact with body-centric religious 
practices like wearing the veil in Islam or refraining from eating certain 
foods in Judaism.
We will see ways that these body-centric practices can be something 
quite different, perhaps more powerful, than mere symbolic representations 
of a belief held by an individual. This examination of dignity, shame, and 
ideas about community and freedom will lead to a discussion of pastoral 
theology that complicates Carrie Doehring’s influential approach and ex-
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poses some of its assumptions based in liberal, Protestant Christianity. I be-
gin by introducing you to the extraordinary life and work of the scholar of 
Islam Saba Mahmood, who began her intellectual life as a staunch secular-
ist in her native Pakistan but came to be an influential critic of secularism’s 
impact on cross-cultural understanding.
The puzzle of secularism and Islam
Mahmood, a professor of anthropology at the University of Califor-
nia, Berkeley, who passed away tragically at age fifty-seven from pancreatic 
cancer in 2018, begins her seminal work on an Egyptian women’s mosque 
movement with a description of a complex set of personal “puzzles.” She 
describes how she came to political consciousness in the ‘70s and ‘80s as a 
secularist for whom “the twin ideologies of critical Marxism and feminism” 
held the promise for human thriving and liberation.2 But then she spent 
years seeing the source of that secularism, the West, support the deeply op-
pressive Zia regime3 in her native country. And, so, after she also saw that 
Islam was not fading away any more than was the Orthodox Judaism of my 
grandfather, this secular person came to be deeply curious about what it 
was about Islam that lead people, including women, to believe its language 
and practices captured their aspirations and deepest yearnings for human 
thriving. 
Her curiosity about these puzzles led her to her research studying a 
women’s mosque movement in Egypt. She went in thinking that Muslim 
women who engage in acts of piety like veiling and studying Islamic texts 
“are conservative and haven’t given much thought to what they are doing.” 
But that’s not what she found: “I was just amazed at how conscious they 
were and what they were struggling with.”4 Her work led her to see secular-
ism as a repository of fundamentally Western worldviews and values that 
transforms even religion itself into something we can think of as secular. 
Secularism, she writes, is not simply “the doctrinal separation of the church 
and the state but the rearticulation of religion in a manner that is commen-
surate with modern sensibilities and modes of governance.”5 
One element of this secularist worldview that constitutes so much of 
what we call religion in the West is to presuppose a semiotic ideology in 
which signifiers are linked to concepts—that is, to assume that the purpose 
of a symbol, such as an element of a religious ritual, is to represent some idea 
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or belief, a thing of the mind, not the body. This representational approach is 
the kind of theology that I perhaps hungered for at my grandfather’s Seder 
table. I wanted some meaning to be assigned to the elements on the Seder 
plate and in the ritual. I must not have been the only one who had this de-
sire for explicit meaning as by the time I was a young adult the denomina-
tion I was a part of would publish a text for the Seder that explained clearly, 
for example, what the karpas—green herbs—on the Seder plate represents.6 
But when I think back to what makes Seder meaningful in my mem-
ory, even my—liberal, Western—mind recalls not the meaning-focused ex-
planations I thought I wanted but, rather, the bodily, sensory experiences 
of my grandfather’s (seemingly) meaningless Seder. The smells, the tastes. 
Even the sound of his Hebrew.
Thus, my experience of Seder hints at least at some of the issues raised 
by Mahmood’s work, the questions of how ritual acts of piety can func-
tion for their adherents, especially outside of liberal, Western traditions. 
Mahmood suggests that the representation-centric type of approach to un-
derstanding religious acts is an impoverished way to understand the lived 
experience of images, icons, and signs in nonsecular religions as it “fails 
to attend to the affective and embodied practices through which a subject 
comes to relate to a particular sign—a relation founded not only on repre-
sentation but also on what I will call attachment and cohabitation.”7 
For her informants—Egyptian women who had broken with tradition 
to begin meeting and studying Islam in traditionally male spaces—“outward 
markers of religiosity [such as] ritual practices, styles of comporting oneself, 
dress, and so on” were meant to bring about an ethical transformation of 
the bodies that repeatedly carried them out,” a transformation expected to 
bring them closer to “the exemplary conduct of the Prophet and his Com-
panions” through cultivating durable virtues. Mahmood found this ethi-
cal transformation to be in no way similar to a Western self-improvement 
aimed “at discovering one’s ‘true’ desires and feelings, or at establishing a 
personal relationship with God, but [rather] at honing one’s rational and 
emotional capacities so as to approximate the exemplary model of the pi-
ous self.”8 
Thus, we start to see just how fundamentally different the kind of pi-
ety practice carried out by Mahmood’s informants might be compared to 
a liberal, Protestant one. In seeking to understand a person adhering to a 
traditional practice, we must ask some serious questions, such as, What if 
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the acts and practices of this person before us are not merely symbolic rep-
resentations of some universal idea but rather are something more like an 
extension of the very body of the person carrying them out? What if, then, 
an attack on what looks like the presentation of a mere symbol to us, such 
as a pictorial representation of Muhammed, is experienced by the believer 
as something more like a physical assault on their own body, a profound 
shame-inducing insult that comes on the heels of the centuries of shame-in-
ducing insults stemming from the sins of colonialism imposed on the Mus-
lim world?9
In his recent revisiting of Mahmood’s work, affect theorist Donovan 
S. Schaefer highlights the role of this shame from being humiliated by the 
West and allies of the West and discusses how religion can act as a power-
ful antidote yielding dignity. He cites psychologist Silvan Tomkins work on 
the power of shame:
As Tomkins writes, “Shame is an affect of relatively high toxicity. . . . It 
strikes deepest into the heart of man. . . . It is felt as a sickness of the soul 
which leaves man naked, defeated, alienated, and lacking in dignity.” . 
. . [I]t [dignity] is psychological oxygen. Bodies will fight to build affec-
tive economies that nurture and sustain dignity and expel shame. Religion 
seems to be especially well-suited to play this part.10
Below, I will discuss in greater detail what Schaefer means by an affec-
tive economy, but first I want to discuss some of the possibilities for compli-
cating our most common understandings of shame and seeing its potential 
to be a productive resource, partly as a means to understand some of the 
polarizing contexts in which we find ourselves seeking to practice ministry 
Complicating shame
We have become used to thinking of shame as something that is al-
ways bad, something that is always counter to the goal of building up the 
self-esteem—the dignity—of a person. Brené Brown’s distinction between 
shame and guilt typifies this view:
[T]here is a profound difference between shame and guilt. I believe that 
guilt is adaptive and helpful—it’s holding something we’ve done or failed 
to do up against our values and feeling psychological discomfort.
I define shame as the intensely painful feeling or experience of believ-
ing that we are flawed and therefore unworthy of love and belonging—
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something we’ve experienced, done, or failed to do makes us unworthy 
of connection.
I don’t believe shame is helpful or productive. In fact, I think shame is 
much more likely to be the source of destructive, hurtful behavior than 
the solution or cure.11
But, one of the founding forces in both affect and queer studies, Eve 
Sedgwick, suggests another possibility that she roots in Silvan Tomkins’s 
work on shame, which is that shame—as painful as it can be to experience—
may be a productive emotion that helps a person define who they are. 
To explain what she means by shame, she begins her essay on it by cit-
ing her experience of an event that transformed the way so many, including 
myself,12 look at the world and experience their own identity—September 
11, 2001:
In the couple of weeks after the World Trade Center was destroyed in 
September 2001, I had a daily repetition of an odd experience. . . . Turning 
from a street onto Fifth Avenue, even if I was heading north, I would feel 
compelled first to look south in the direction of the World Trade Center, 
now gone. This inexplicably furtive glance was associated with a con-
scious wish: that my southward vista would again be blocked by the fa-
miliar sight of the pre-September 11 twin towers, somehow come back to 
loom over us in all their complacent ugliness. But, of course, the towers 
were always still gone. Turning away, shame was what I would feel.13
This process of looking to see something, expecting it to be there and 
finding it not there—whether one is an infant offering a smile to a moth-
er in hope of a returned glance or one is an adult being refused a view 
by a destroyed building—is the fundamental experience of shame in the 
Tomkins-esque framework Sedgwick builds upon. It is an experience of a 
kind of rejection “where the question of identity arises most originarily and 
most relationally.”14 That is, in Sedgwick’s view, experiences of shame shape 
us relationally in profound and permanent ways. Shame, then, cannot be 
cured; to try and remove a person’s shame would be, to provide an extreme 
image, like using a lobotomy to try and cure a mental illness—it might calm 
a person, but it would also destroy them. Shame cannot be removed, but it 
can be used:
The forms taken by shame are not distinct “toxic” parts of a group or in-
dividual identity that can be excised. . . . [Instead, t]hey are available for 
the work of metamorphosis, reframing, refiguration, transfiguration, af-
fective and symbolic loading and deformation.15
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Why, then, is the possibility of reframing or transforming shame so 
important to us as spiritual caregivers—or simply as people hoping for a 
more just world as a whole? I think it is because it opens up to us possibili-
ties for profound personal or societal change that do not involve the per-
haps impossible task of changing their beliefs. More profoundly, it starts to 
open up the possibility that beliefs are not of paramount importance at all 
but rather that affective experiences—of things like shame—are. Thus, per-
haps when I come across a Trump supporter wearing a Make America Great 
Again hat I might be able to avoid automatically assuming that the hat indi-
cates its wearer subscribes to certain, perhaps racist, beliefs, and instead at 
least entertain the possibility that it represents an embodied attempt to find 
dignity in a world that they experience as shaming.16 And that change in 
perspective might allow me as a spiritual caregiver to find paths to empathy 
and caring with my full self that would have been closed to me otherwise.
Paths to dignity—affective economies
Above, I mentioned that Schaefer seeks to build upon Mahmood’s 
work by reading it through the lens of an affective economy, which he bor-
rows from the work of Sara Ahmed.17 Ahmed uses the language of economy 
to express her claim that affects can be understood as behaving in ways that 
money behaves. It circulates. It accumulates. It can be acquired. 
Emotions also, Ahmed says, have the power to “align individuals with 
communities—or bodily space with social space.”18 But this economic acqui-
sition process is not a matter of mere thinking. Schaefer writes, “We become 
religious (or secular) through the pulses of an affective economy; we do not 
coolly select affects in order to become religious.”19 That is, we do not neces-
sarily think our way to a set of religious beliefs or practices—we feel our way 
there. Or, perhaps even the feelings, the affective economy, impact on bodies 
in a way that leads bodies to engage in practices. Shame, then—perhaps the 
shame yielded by being subjected to a modern secularist state, whether it’s 
in Pakistan or Idaho—causes bodies to hunger for dignity, which the bod-
ies find through pious practices. Writes Schaefer of Mahmood’s informants:
The retrieval of a set of religious lifeways that distinguished politically 
disenfranchised women from a stiflingly aloof ruling class and reconsti-
tuted them as religious bodies set apart from the world offered a strategy 
for affirming dignity in the face of everyday degradation. It articulated 
their bodies to a set of cultural formations suffused with confidence, maj-
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esty, and glory. It seems likely that this interlocked with a felt resistance to 
the global Euro-American hegemony propping up the Egyptian dictator. . 
. . The return to Islamism is, in part, an expression of defiance, an embod-
ied gesture in a global affective economy that develops the dignity of the 
religious bodies involved.
Religion often serves this function of a perpetual dignity machine. The doc-
trinal and moral content of religion operates as a set of struts for building 
up an embodied sense of dignity.20
Complicating freedom—the role of group identity
[H]ow does this history make us rethink the politics of tolerance and plu-
ralism beyond the confines of individualism to include the rights of plural 
social groupings? Or, for that matter, to ask whether the liberal meaning 
of tolerance is the best or the most desirable one; what does this under-
standing preclude, under what kinds of presuppositions, and for whom?
—Saba Mahmood21
The above quote, from an anthology on Islam and democracy, reflects 
Mahmood’s effort to argue that the Western conception of ethics and human 
thriving, so focused on the rights, agency, and self-actualization of the indi-
vidual, is not the only possible path forward as so many of us steeped in the 
liberalism of the West assume. Especially when we are with people who are 
first-generation immigrants to the West, we must consider the depth of how 
different their values may be than our own. 
Even when it comes to values that we might think are uniquely West-
ern, such as pluralism, Mahmood maintains that there are alternatives. 
“Different conceptions of religious and communal coexistence, for example, 
informed the social and political life of the diverse communities that lived 
under the Ottoman Empire,” writes Mahmood. This system “enabled dif-
ferent social groups living under a shared political structure to practice dis-
tinct ways of life” with their own social institutions.22 Mahmood does not 
maintain that this system was superior or that it made “non-Muslims the 
social or legal equals of Muslims, but it did grant them a certain autonomy 
to practice and develop their traditions.”23 As spiritual caregivers, we should 
be aware of the loss, and possible shame, that attends losing those commu-
nal institutions. More importantly, we should be working to uncover our 
Western, liberal biases that block us from seeing not only that shame but 
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also the embodied practices that might help people move beyond shame to 
dignity.
Complicating deliberative theology
Our discussion of Mahmood’s work and of Schaefer’s effort to use af-
fect studies theory to deepen it provides an opportunity to ask about the bi-
ases we find in established Western pastoral care approaches. Here, I briefly 
discuss Doehring’s pastoral theology framework of embedded versus de-
liberative theologies and consider alternatives in the light of our discussion 
above.
Embedded theologies, Doehring says, are usually instilled in child-
hood and tend to be simple and straightforward; they function well for peo-
ple until they come to a trauma, like becoming ill or losing of a loved one 
to cancer, that challenges elements of ideas like “the good and faithful will 
prosper” or “a personal angel watches over me.” Writes Doehring:
People may not even be aware of their embedded theology until they ex-
perience an existential crisis or decentering experience that disrupts their 
world, pushing deep layers of sometimes unconscious beliefs, values, and 
practices to the surface. Such moments provide opportunities to excavate 
these beliefs, values, and habitual ways of coping and decide whether 
such embedded theologies are still relevant and meaningful, especially 
in terms of helping people connect with a sense of the sacred and make 
sense of what is happening.24 
The excavation Doehring refers to is a process of deliberation, an exer-
cise in what she calls deliberative theology, which is “the understanding of 
faith that emerges from a process of carefully reflecting on embedded theo-
logical convictions.”25 Spiritual caregivers can help guide a person through 
this process of becoming aware of their embedded theologies and then ex-
amining whether these beliefs—and how they affect how the person feels 
and acts in the world—are life-giving or life-limiting.
We can see this deliberative approach to theology as the opposite of 
an economy of dignity approach—as coolly selecting beliefs and affects to 
form our individual spiritual system rather than forming our religiosity or 
spiritual system based on the pulses of an affective economy. That is, this is 
an approach that is fundamentally cognitive and focused on the individual 
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as opposed to one that is focused on either the affective realm or on a col-
lective identity.
But what if the real spiritual need of the person in a hospital bed, for 
example, is the restoration of dignity? And what if the changes in context 
related to illness, trauma, or loss is causing affects to circulate in a way that 
actually gives traditional religious practices—like wearing the hijab or re-
ligious refraining practices like the Christian practice of Lent or the Jewish 
practices of keeping Shabbat or obeying the eating laws of kashrut—more 
value as a means to acquire such a restoration? 
If so, the spiritual caregiver might be better guided by an approach 
more like the one imagined here. There are implications, especially for the 
task of assessing the spiritual needs of a care-seeker. It may not be enough 
to base that assessment on the past spiritual practices and life of the per-
son. Even someone who has not been affiliated with religion for a long time, 
like a growing number of Jews and other Americans,26 may find themselves 
wanting to embrace religious symbols, texts, and practices they had previ-
ously rejected. 
Caregiving in a polarized age
Worldwide, we live in an age of polarization that seems to get worse 
with every day. For most people, it is possible to shelter yourself from peo-
ple on ‘the other side’ by limiting our friend and acquaintance networks, 
whether on social media or in the ‘flesh-and-blood’ world. But chaplains 
have no such luxury. 
A fearless uncovering and examining of our own biases is essential if 
we want to be able to be able to offer ourselves fully to the people we care 
for. Affect studies theory and the other body-centric ways of thought ex-
plored here make it possible to move beyond liberal, Western assumptions 
that individual beliefs are the most important elements of the spiritual lives 
of the people we meet. By focusing on the same affects raised by the Exodus 
story commemorated in the Passover Seder—shame and dignity—we can 
see new possibilities across faiths for engaging in both spiritual assessment 
and caregiving. We can come to see religion as a perpetual dignity machine.
Further study is needed to confirm and further explore the possibili-
ties touched on in this essay. We need ways of understanding what it is that 
happens between a body and its encounter with a religious practice. We 
ABRAMS
56
need theoretical models that have explanatory power for understanding the 
complex relationship of contexts and feelings. An economic affective model 
may help with this and with moving us beyond a neoliberal conception that 
gives us only binary ways of understanding the relationship between the 
secular and the religious.
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commonly printed in pamphlet form and distributed to all Seder participants. 
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12 I worked on the twenty-seventh floor of Tower 2 for ten years.
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NC: Duke University Press, 2003), 35. 
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16 See Fintan O’Toole’s Heroic Failure for a recent effort to understand one nonliberal 
movement, the movement for Brexit, as an expression of shame (which the author de-
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21 Saba Mahmood, “Is Liberalism Islam’s Only Answer?,” 76. In Khaled Abou El Fadl, 
Islam and the Challenge of Democracy, ed. Deborah Chasman and Joshua Cohen (Princ-
eton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2015). 
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